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This study evaluates the hypothesis of complementarity in a case where a firm considers 
undertaking two types of possible innovation activities: internal R+D and buying external 
knowledge. The methodology to evaluate the hypothesis is based on Cassiman and 
Vegeuleres (2006) and Schmiedeberg (2008), which was applied in a transversal selection 
of manufacturing and innovative plants in Chile. The results do not support the hypothesis 
of complementarity and suggest a substitution between innovation activities that were taken 
into consideration. The absence of complementarity in the group of studied plants means 
that the incentives aimed at buying knowledge do not improve the performance of internal 
R+D capacities, at least within the 2003-2004 period. Furthermore, such incentives might 




Firms that decide to innovate must, consequently, elucidate how they will organize 
themselves in order to do it; that is to say, they must choose activities which are non-
exclusive. Some such activities include the production of internal knowledge, the buy of 
knowledge and the cooperation with other agents to create knowledge. The different 
combinations of activities make up the potential set of innovation strategies. 
 
Trade literature shows that the combination of different innovation activities has positive 
effects on the innovative performance of a firm: internal R+D and external know-how 
(Cassiman and Vegeulers, 2006); internal R+D and R+D cooperation (Schmiedeberg, 
2008). It can be observed in a wider context that the combination of external knowledge 
and internal knowledge has positive effects on a firm’s productivity (Bonte, 2003; Lokshin 
et al., 2006). All the commented evidence supports what has been known as 
complementarity between innovation activities. 
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Complementarity between innovation activities is a phenomenon principally studied in the 
developed world; however, in general, it is a little explored area in developing countries. 
Using information from Chilean plants some works have studied innovative performance 
(Benavente, 2005) and the determinants of cooperation in innovation activities (Benavente 
and Lauterbach, 2007), nevertheless, innovative performance has not yet been related to 
innovation activities. 
  
This work evaluates complementarity between internal R+D innovation activities and 
buying knowledge. The methodology used is obtained from Cassiman and Vegeuleres 
(2006) and Schmiedeberg (2008), which is then applied to a transversal section of data 
from innovative and manufacturing establishments in Chile. The proposed procedure 
analyzes the determinants of adoption of innovation activities and the relation between 
these activities with the innovative performance of the plants is explicitly linked. 
 
In addition to research innovation, the evaluation of the hypothesis of complementarity 
provides information with regard to the results expected from a subsidy to R+D 
outsourcing1 . If the internal and external innovation activities are complementary, one of 
the possible effects of a subsidy for R+D outsourcing would be strengthening the capacity 
of “in-house” innovation. 
 
The results permit us to conclude that innovation activities of doing R&D and buying 
knowledge are not complementary, and that they would even have a substitutive relation. 
The conceptual framework that guides this work suggests that there can be a replacement 
between doing R&D and buying knowledge when knowledge or technology bought outside 
the firm has scarce novelty in the firm’s context. 
 
For the group of studied plants, evidence suggests that the incentives for the buy of 
knowledge will not improve the performance of its internal R+D capacities, at least within 
the 2003-2004 period. Furthermore, such incentives might even reduce innovative 
performance of the establishments. 
 
Below, we consecutively present the conceptual framework; the empirical evidence for 
complementarity between innovation activities; the methodology; the sample and the 
variables used; the results; and, finally, the conclusions. 
2 Conceptual framework 
 
The concept of complementarity between the activities available to a firm was coined by 
literature dealing with organizational design (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990; Athey and Stern, 
1998). It was later employed for the study of complementarity between innovation 
activities (Cassiman and Vegeulers, 2006; Lucena, 2007; and, Schmiedeberg, 2008).  
 
                                               
1 Law 20.241 establishes a tax incentive for private R+D investment. First category taxpayers of the Tax 
Income Law may choose a subsidy of up to 46 % of R+D investment when R+D contracts are celebrated with 
research centers registered with CORFO and whose contracted amounts exceed 100 UTM. 
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When a firm can adopt two innovation activities, complementarity exists when the 
incremental performance reached by having adopted both activities is higher than 
performance achieved when an activity is carried out in the absence of the other one.2  
 
The relation of complementarity between activities can be represented by super-modular 
functions of innovative performance. 3 For two activities any 1A  and 2A with a value 1 
when they are adopted and 0 in the other case )A,f(A 21  is a function of innovative super-
modular performance if: 
 
   (1) 
 
The justification of the hypothesis of complementarity between innovation activities comes 
from the double role of internal R+D: it has been highlighted that in addition to the increase 
of the stock of internal knowledge created by R+D , it also allows the firm to improve the 
capacity to absorb knowledge and technology available externally (Cohen and Levinthal, 
1989). 4 
 
At the same time, it has been indicated that once a new technology is acquired, an 
assimilation and learning phase begins in the context of the acquired technology, be it in 
order to adapt it to the means of use and/or to adapt the productive means to the new 
technology (Katz, 1976). A similar idea is offered by Zahra and George (2002), who 
indicate that to effectively absorb acquired technology it is necessary to assimilate, 
transform and develop it. All in all, once external technology is acquired, internal R+D 
activities might be required to achieve external knowledge absorption. 5 
 
                                               
2 The definition of the number of possible activities determines the firm’s set of choice possibilities, which is 
known as ex ante.  
3 Milgrom and Roberts (1990) call a function super-modular if it displays complementarities between their 
arguments. 
4 It is supposed that the flow of external knowledge contributes to the firm’s accumulation of knowledge, 
which has positive effects on the function of the firm’s benefits, but at decreasing rates.  
External knowledge can arise from the intra-industrial external factors, but also from other sources that are 
outside the economic classification that identifies firms as, for example, universities, technological centers 
and/or equipment suppliers. 
5 According to Zahra and George (2002), the definitions of the mentioned actions are: 
 
1. Acquisition: refers to the skills of the firm to identify and to acquire knowledge created externally. 
2. Assimilation: refers to the routines and processes that permit the firm to analyze process, interpret 
and understand the information coming from external sources. 
3. Transformation: denotes the firm’s skill to develop and improve the routines that facilitate the 
combination the existing knowledge with the recently acquired and assimilated knowledge.  
4. Development: refers to the routines that permit the firm to refine, extend and leverage the existing 
competences, or to create new competences by incorporating acquired and transformed knowledge 







As long as external knowledge is innovative in the firm’s context, it will be necessary to 
accumulate some degree of internal knowledge to use the market; at the same time, once 
innovative external technology is acquired, a phase of assimilation and learning is expected.  
 
And to the contrary, if external knowledge is not innovative in the firm’s context, the 
source of technology that provides the minimum total cost between outsourcing and 
internal creation of knowledge is chosen, given that knowledge created internally will be a 
perfect substitute for external knowledge. 
  
The creation of knowledge compared to the production of other goods is highly 
suspenseful, it requires creative solutions and it must deal with potential technology leaks 
(Ulset, 1996), all the above increasing the cost of contracts. Consequently, the higher the 
costs of using the market, ceteris paribus, the higher the probability of internalizing the 
creation of knowledge in relation to of the probability of outsourcing the creation of 
knowledge.  
 
Notwithstanding the above, when, in the firm’s context, external knowledge is innovative 
there are incentives to acquiring it even in the presence of the costs arising from using the 
technology market. 
 
3 Empiric evidence 
 
The first studies which analyzed the relation between a firm’s R+D activities focused on 
knowledge-intensive sectors such as, for example, the pharmaceutical sector. Among them, 
Arora and Gambardella (1990) indicate that the links between big pharmaceutical firm 
(United States, Europe and Japan) with similar companies, universities or new 
biotechnology firms were correlated positively, even after being controlled by the firms’ 
characteristics. 6 
 
Furthermore, Pisano (1990) analyzes the decision to develop new pharmaceutical products 
based on biotechnology through the use of internal R+D or using contractual agreements 
with other firms. The study included a set of established pharmaceutical firms and there is 
evidence which indicates that transaction costs benefit R+D internalization. 7 
 
Other studies focused on establishing the relation between internal R+D expense and 
external R+D expense. For example, for a sample of manufacturing firms in the county of 
Flanders, Belgium, Vegeulers (1997) finds that R+D cooperation and, to a lesser degree, 
R+D outsourcing have a positive effect on internal R+D expense, but only if firms can 
absorb external knowledge through an R+D department. Additionally, he also indicates that 
with higher internal R+D expenditure, R+D expenditures on cooperation increases. 
                                               
6 The external links considered are as follows: research agreements with other firms; research agreements 
with universities; investment in stocks of new biotechnology firms; and, acquisition of new biotechnology 
firms.  
7 A small number of institutions that can continue R+D project development previously started by another 
proponent (small-numbers bargaining) benefits R+D internalization.  
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The study of the effect of external knowledge on productivity can be found in Bonte 
(2003). The author uses a sample of German firms where he identified a positive relation 
between total factor productivity and the quotient between external R+D expenditure and 
internal R+D expenditure, after having been controlled by the firm's other characteristics. 
 
Cassiman and Vegeulers (2006) study the effect of internal R+D and the external know-
how on the firm's innovative performance through a cross-section of manufacturing firms 
in Belgium. The study concludes that there is evidence of complementarity between both 
activities, even after controlling the endogeneity of innovation activities. 
 
A similar study was carried out by Schmiedeberg (2008), who uses a cross-section of 
German manufacturing firms to study the relation between internal R+D and external R+D; 
and, between internal R+D and R+D cooperation. The study concludes that there exists 
evidence of complementarity between internal R+D and R+D cooperation, but that there is 
no strong evidence with regard to complementarity between internal R+D and outsourced 
R+D. 
 
Other studies use panel information to study complementarity between R+D activities. 
Lokshin et al. (2006) analyzes the impact of internal and external R+D on work 
productivity for a set of innovative Dutch companies. The study indicates that external R+D 
expense has positive effects on work productivity only when there is sufficient expense on 
internal R+D. 
 
At the same time, Lucena (2007) uses a set of Spanish manufacturing firms to analyze the 
relation between internal R+D, cooperative research and externalizing R+D. The study has 
found evidence in favour of complementarity between the three above mentioned activities.  
 
It should be noted that no evidence has been found for Latin America. Nevertheless, for 
Chile some innovation cases have been documented where we can see the importance of 
external knowledge. 8 
 
 
                                               
8 For example, the SRC salmon vaccine was the result of a joint effort between Fundación Ciencia para la 
Vida (Dr. Valenzuela) and Fundación Chile (Dr. Parada); the innovation of Lucien Biotechnologies came 
from the interaction of a biochemist, an engineer and a doctorate student; the Valdez chair arose from the idea 
of making use of the quality of laminated wood used for tennis rackets; and, for the renowned biologist 
Humberto Maturana the experience of innovating can be summed up this way: " a person does something that 
for him or her seems absolutely natural and other people say: ahhhh ”. All the cases were obtained from 
Innovation Made in Chile 2007. Fundación Chile País Digital. To see detail use link  




4 Methodology   
 
This section presents the methodology to evaluate the hypothesis of complementarity, when 
there are only two innovation activities and when transversal information is available, 
following the work of Cassiman and Vegeulers (2006) and Schmiedeberg (2008).  
  
It is a three-step methodology: a model of innovation activities selection; a model of 
innovative performance to directly evaluate the hypothesis of complementarity between 
innovation activities; and, a procedure developed by Cassiman and Vegeulers (2006) to 
correct the estimation of innovative performance by the endogeneity of innovation 
activities.  
 
4.1 Adoption of innovation activities: 
 
The first complementarity test between innovation activities can be found within the 
framework of activity selection.  
 
The presumption of the model is that the adoption of innovation activities corresponds to a 
maximization process of expected benefits and seeks to evaluate the sign of the conditional 
correlation between innovation activities, since in the presence of complementarity among 
innovation activities the quotient of conditional correlation must be positive. 
 
This approach has been used in trade literature (Arora and Gambardella, 1990; Cassiman 
and Vegeulers, 1998; Schmiedeberg, 2008), however, even if it is conditioned by certain 
characteristics of the firm and of the firm's environment, the correlation might also be 
positive as a consequence of the non-observed heterogeneity (Arora, 1996; Athey and 
Stern, 1998). Consequently, it is only a weak test for complementarity. 
 
In formal terms, let’s suppose that the value of the adoption of innovation activities ( iA1 ,
iA2  
) depends on the expected net benefit associated with each activity, which is not observed 
by the investigator. The only available information is that each innovation activity has a 
value 1 when the firm undertakes it and 0 in the opposite case. 
 
Where *ijA  is the net expected benefit associated with activity j , with j  = 1,2, which can 
be expressed in the following way: 
 
]2,1[  con  *  jeBXA ij
ii
j , (2)  
 
Where iX it is a vector of exogenous variables that influence the adoption of innovation 
activities (benefits and costs). At the same time, ije  follows a bi-varied distribution with 
















The   parameter is the correlation quotient between ie1  and
ie2 .  
 






In this context, there will be evidence in favour of complementarity when   is statistically 
higher than zero.  
4.2 Innovative performance: 
 
The model which permits to directly evaluate the hypothesis of complementarity is the 
innovative performance model (Cassiman and Vegeulers, 2006; Lucena, 2007; 
Schmiedeberg, 2008).  
 
In this case, it is assumed that there is a measure of innovative performance i , which is a 
function of innovation activities iA1  and
iA2 , and of exogenous variables vector
iZ . 
 
iiiiiiiiii ZAAAAZAA   1221221121 );;(  (3) 
 
 
In equation (3), i  represents the term of stochastic error which is not correlated with the 
determinants of the adoption of innovation activities, that is to say, it is supposed that 
innovation activities are exogenous. 
 






                                               
9 Schmiedeberg (2008) proposes this complementarity test which is equivalent to the one used by Cassiman 
and Vegeulers (2006) and consistent with the structure of a super-modular function. 
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4.3 Combination of adoption approach and innovative 
performance: 
 
When relaxing the assumption that the “unobserved” determinants of the adoption of 
activities are not correlated with i , the parameters associated with innovation activities are 
not necessarily consistent.  
 
To obtain consistent estimators, Cassiman and Veugelers (2006) propose a two-stage 
procedure. The method consists of obtaining predictions of the model of activities adoption 
which in the second stage are used as innovation activities instruments in the function of 
innovative performance. In the second stage, the innovative performance model is 
estimated using the instrumental variables method. 
5 The sample and the variables 
 
The information at plant level comes from the IV Technological Innovation Survey (2005) 
developed and carried out by the National Statistics Institute (INE) and information 
corresponding to 2003 and 2004. The survey gathered information from 3,122 
establishments from the following sectors: manufacture, mining, power generation and 
distribution and others. 10 The total number of surveyed establishments is representative of 
a universe of firms totalling more than 2,400 UF in sales per annum. It must be observed 
that the survey questionnaire follows the general guidelines suggested by the OECD for 
innovation surveys.  
 
The survey gathers information with regard to different types of innovations, among which 
there are product, service and process innovations (technological innovation), but also 
design, packing and management. Consequently, an establishment is innovative if it can 
show it has obtained innovations in at least one of the above mentioned categories. 11 
 
To select the sample of establishments, two criteria were used: reduction of the unobserved 
heterogeneity or heterogeneity that the supposed methodological structure does not permit 
to control; and, at the same time, the availability of impact and control information.  
 
To limit the exposure to unobserved or uncontrollable heterogeneity only one economic 
sector was selected, to be specific manufacture, and all the establishments that said to carry 
out cooperation in innovative activities were eliminated. 12 In relation to the availability of 
                                               
10 In the sample a firm can be an owner of a number of plants. 
11 It is shown that the majority of manufacturing and innovating establishments developed more than one type 
of innovation, and that the most popular ones are process, organisation and product innovations, respectively.  
12 The exclusion of firms that co-operate in the development of innovation activities permits to isolate the 
firms that certainly deal with a set of selection possibilities different from the one supposed for the work. It 
was shown that the total number of observations of cooperating plants was 68.  
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information, the construction of the survey establishes that the questions related to all the 
impact variables are answered only by the innovative plants. 13 
 
The sample includes 522 observations of manufacturing and innovative plants, equivalent 
to 45 % of the total observations of manufacturing plants considered in the survey. 14 
 
The sample includes the relatively large plants considered in the survey given that it does 
not represent the population of manufacturing firms' characteristics to the 2003 Annual 
National Industrial Survey (ENIA). And more specifically, there is an over-representation 
of medium and large plants. 15 The above is particularly noticeable in large plants whose 
presence in the ENIA and the sample is 9 % and 30 %, respectively. 16 
 
5.1 Model of innovation activates adoption  
 
The innovation activities are constructed on the basis of the response to qualitative 
questions with regard to the origin of R+D or knowledge for the 2003-2004 periods, in such 
way that all the approaches to innovation activities are dychotomic variable (1 or 0).  
 
The make variable approaches the development of internal R+D activities. The internal 
activities include those carried out by a department dedicated to the innovation such as 
those R+D activities that are sporadically undertaken by groups not specializing in 
innovation, for example, maintenance groups, quality control, processes engineering, client 
service, to mention a few. 
 
In relation to the sources of external knowledge, it is supposed that a plant can acquire 
patents, licenses or know- how or can outsource R+D. In the last case, it is presumed that 
there exists a contract for the supply of services that involves a natural person, a public 
institution, a university or a private company. It is where a firm buys external knowledge 
(buy) when it acquires or outsources knowledge (Cassiman and Vegeulers, 2006). 
 
The representation of innovation activities by dychotomic variables (1 or 0) has been 
widely used in trade literature (Cassiman and Vegeulers, 1998; Cassiman and Vegeuleres, 
2006; Lucena, 2007; Schmiedeberg, 2008), however, it also has some disadvantages. The 
dychotomic variables only take into account the adoption of activities, but do not consider 
the intensity with which each activity is carried out (Lokshin et to., 2006; Schmiedeberg, 
                                               
13 The plants that do not report innovation only answer questions with regard to the acquisition of equipment; 
to the intellectual property rights and know-how; to innovation obstacles; and, the perspectives of future 
innovations. 
14 Expansion factors were not used since they are not related to the importance of the innovative reality of the 
plants, but also because the original sample was manipulated previously.  
15 30 % of the plants in the sample are large, 33% medium-sized, 35% small and 2% micro. The classification 
of the size of the plants was done according to the number of employees reported by the plants in 2003. The 
large plants have 200 or more employees, the medium-sized ones between 50 and 199 employees, the small 
ones between 10 and 49 employees and the micro ones 9 employees or fewer. 
16 2003 National Annual Industrial Survey Volume I and II (Encuesta Nacional Industrial Anual Volumen I y 
II) published in May, 2006 by the National Statistics Institute. Tables 18 A and 18 B. 
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2008); in turn, the plants that develop multiple projects may carry out activities 
simultaneously but they do not have an effective relation (Schmiedeberg, 2008). 
 
A way of interpreting the adoption of innovation activities consists of supposing that it 
depends from the expected benefit net of expenses that each plants obtains when it 
undertakes them; however, the information used to size the expected net benefit from the 
adoption of activities generally is not observed directly. At the same time, there are no 
theoretical models that direct the selection of variables (Cassiman and Vegeulers, 2006). 
 
The reviewed literature indicates that the adoption of activities has been linked to the scale 
of the firm, with inputs measures aimed at innovation, but also with the absorptive capacity 
of external knowledge and with knowledge adequacy (Cassiman and Vegeulers, 1998; 
Cassiman and Vegeuleres, 2006; Schmiedeberg, 2008).  
 
The relatively large firms deal with economies of scale and scope that increases the 
probability of adopting the make activity. The scale of the plant is approximated by the 
number of workers employed in the plant in 2003 and its effect is controlled by the variable 
in levels and by square value. 
 
The intensity with which the plants dedicate their resources to innovation might be relevant 
if it is related with the level of technological challenge that the plant is dealing with. A 
possible way of measuring the technological level of the plant is the R+D expense per 
worker in 2003.  
 
The definition of absorptive capacity that includes all the others provided by trade literature 
can be found in the work of Zahra and George (2002), and is defined as a set of 
organizational routines and processes through which firms acquire, assimilate, transform 
and develop knowledge to produce a dynamic organizational ability (an ability to 
effectively create, manage and develop knowledge). A partial vision of absorptive capacity 
can be found in the work of Cassiman and Vegeulers (2006), who propose that the 
capacities of a firm to undertake basic R+D are usually made up by the firm's absorption 
capacity. 
 
This work makes a supposition that the plants capable of perceiving the most basic 
knowledge as relevant to innovate have a relatively higher external knowledge absorption 
capacity. To be more specific, the declaration of each plant is used with regard to the 
importance for innovation of the information obtained from institutional sources in the 
2003-2004 period. 17  
 
As the need for basic knowledge is linked to the economic sector in which each plant 
operates (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989), the average importance for the respective two-digit 
ISIC sector was deducted from each self-report. 18 
                                               
17 Institutional sources are universities and other higher education entities, public or government research 
institutes.  
18  Another approach to absorptive capacity can be found in the work of Vegeulers (1997) who uses a 
dychotomic variable that identifies the plants with an internal R+D department with full-time staff. At the 
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It is expected that the higher the external knowledge absorption capacity, the bigger the 
probability of adopting buy, given that there are lower costs of knowledge acquisition 
(Contractor, 1983) and lower transaction costs. In the latter case, it is presumed that the 
plants with higher absorptive capacity have fewer difficulties to identify opportunities and 
risks, to choose suppliers and to monitor the progress of the projects. At the same time, 
higher external knowledge absorptive capacity can trigger assimilation cycles, knowledge 
transformation and development, which would probably require the implementation of 
internal R+D activities. 
 
In relation to knowledge ownership, intellectual property rights (IPR) permit to turn the 
result of an investment (knowledge) with public good characteristics into a private good. 
The access to IPR promotes innovation, be it by means of internal or external activities, and 
it reduces outsourcing transaction costs. Since the access to IPR is heterogeneous according 
to the economic sector, it is approximated by the proportion of plants that have requested 
IPR by two-digit ISIC sector. 
 
It is not always possible to protect knowledge through IPR. One example is when the result 
of R+D is tacit knowledge. In the last case other methods are used to protect knowledge, 
generally based on a company’s internal processes (secrets, encrypting, passwords, 
employment contracts, complexity, among others), which make up what is known as 
strategic protection. It should be noted that strategic protection is only useful when 
protecting knowledge created within a company. 
 
The information available in the survey does not permit to find an approach for strategic 
protection; however, a firm will perceive that the creation of knowledge is unprotected 
when it is complex to protect knowledge through IPR and through strategic protection. It is 
why a general measure of adequacy problems is used which is represented by the 
proportion of plants that perceive facility to imitate technology for two-digit ISIC sector. 
 
It is expected that the bigger the lack of protection of knowledge perceived by the plants, 
the higher the probability of adopting make, be it as a protection measure or as a method 
that makes it easer to copy available knowledge.  
 
In order control the heterogeneity of technology used by the plants they were grouped in 
three exclusive categories: low technology, medium-low and high technology. The 
classification low technology and medium- low technology was constructed following 
OECD (2003), while high technology corresponds to all the plants that were not classified 






                                                                                                                                               
same time, Schmiedeberg (2008) approaches absorptive capacity by the proportion of qualified workers in the 
total number a company’s employees. 
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5.2 Innovative performance model  
 
The innovative performance is approached by the percentage of the sale of innovated 
products in relation to all the sales for the 2003-2004 periods. The same type of approach 
was used by Cassiman and Vegeulers (2006), Lucena (2007) and Schmiedeberg (2008). 
The use of this performance measure prevents unobserved heterogeneity deriving from the 
rest of the firm’s operations that affects other performance measures of the firm such as, for 
example, the total factor productivity. 
 
Since there exists a set of plants that lack product or services innovations introduced in the 
market and/or which through innovation do not seek sales but focus on other objectives 
(cost reduction or complying with environmental regulations, among other aims), the 
performance measure will be censured at 0 value. To capture the censure of the dependent 
variable, the model of innovative performance is estimated by means of the Tobit model. 19 
 
The Tobit model makes an assumption that it is only possible to observe the performance of 
the plants that could implement product or service innovations ( iinnsales _ ), whose value 
depends on a latent variable ( *_ iinnsales ) that represents the implementation of product or 
service innovations, as shown below: 
 
  
0ales_    0


























To prove the robustness of the results deriving from the Tobit model another approach of 
innovative performance is used. The alternative measure is on the reports of achievements 
in product or service innovations. In this case, the variable that represents the achievement 
of product or service innovations ( ipos ) is dychotomic (1 or 0), since the equation (2) is 
estimated by a conventional Probit model. 20 
 
The reviewed literature suggests that in addition to the importance of innovation activities 
for a company’s innovative performance, what is relevant is the scale of the establishment, 
the inputs for innovation and the exposure to competitiveness (Cassiman and Vegeulers, 
2006; Lucena, 2007; Schmiedeberg, 2008). 
 
The relation of the scale of the establishment with innovative performance is not clear, as 
detailed in Cassiman and Vegeulers (2006). Large firms can display higher market power 
or adopt economies of scale and scope, which would increase innovative performance; 
contrarily, small firms may be less beaurocratic and thus more efficient as to innovations; 
and, small firms might be better equipped to obtain a high participation in the sale of new 
                                               
19 More details in Greene (2003) p. 829. As can be seen in table 5.1., the measure of innovative performance 
is also an ordered variable, which is not considered by the Tobit model. 
20 More details in Greene (2003) p. 751. 
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or innovative goods or introduced in the total number of their sales. As in the previous 
model, the scale of the establishment is approached by the number of workers in the 
establishment in 2003 and for the square of the number. 
 
The inputs aimed at innovation have a direct bearing on innovative performance, be it 
because they increase innovating probability or because they increase the degree of 
innovations disruption. To measure inputs for innovation we use R+D expense per worker 
in 2003.  
 
The exposure to competitiveness is also related to innovative performance. The exposure to 
competitiveness is approached by the export nature of the plant (the plant either exported 
products in 2003 or it did not), given that it is presumed they face higher competition than 
the firms that deal with the internal market. It is expected that there is a positive effect of 
the exposure to international competitiveness on innovative performance. 
 
Notwithstanding the above, it is necessary to take into consideration that the export status 
of a plant can also promote innovative performance through other means: because the plant 
has access to external sources of knowledge and/or because the plant deals with a larger-
sized market than the local market.  
 
The innovative performance model also uses sector controls referred to in the activity 
adoption model.  
 
Below, there are approaches to innovation activities, the measures of innovative 
performance and the independent variables used in the quantitative analysis. Table 5.1. 
details the variables that will be used in the empirical exercises and their respective 
descriptive statistics, whereas Annex 1 shows primary information extracted from the IV 
Technological Innovation Survey. 
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Table 5.1.: Description of variables and descriptive statistics  
 
Name  approximation  mean median S.D. 
sales_inn 
Percentage of sales of innovated products in relation to the 
total sales for the 2003-2004 period: the variables takes 5 
values: 0, 0.06, 0.21, 0.51 y 0.86, which correspond to the 
average of the extreme values of the reported percentage 
ranges [1 (0%), 2 (1-10%), 3 (10 to 30%), 4 (31-70%) y 5 (71-
100%)].  
0.21 0.06 0.25 
inn_pos Product or service innovation in 2003 and/or 2004: 1 if the plant innovated products or services; 0 otherwise. 0.79 1.00 0.41 
make  Internal R+D in 2003 and/or 2004: 1 if R+D was carried out within the plant; 0 otherwise. 0.58 1.00 0.49 
buy  Buy of external knowledge in 2003 and/or 2004: 1 if acquired or outsourced knowledge; 0 otherwise. 0.31 0.00 0.46 
absorption 
External knowledge absorption capacity: difference between 
the importance for the plant of information for innovation 
coming from institutional sources and the average of 
importance of the same information for its respective ISIC two 
digit classification  
0.14 -0.16 1.10 
ipr 
Knowledge protection through Intellectual Property Rights 
(IPR): Proportion of plants that have requested IPR by ISIC 
two digit category.  
0.39 0.32 0.27 
adequacy  
Knowledge adequacy problems: Proportion of plants that 
perceives some kind of lack of protection of knowledge by ISIC 
two digit category. 
0.79 0.79 0.07 
employment Scale of establishment: hundreds of workers in 2003. 2.02 0.84 3.19 
exports  Exposure to international competitiveness: 1 if the plants had exports in 2003; 0 otherwise. 0.49 1.00 0.50 
int_inn Inputs for innovation or innovation intensity: R+D expense per worker in 2003 (in millions of $ in 2003). 0.46 0.02 1.65 
b_tec Group that uses low technology: 1 if ISIC = 15 - 22, 36; 0 otherwise. 0.45 0.00 0.50 
mb_tec Group that uses medium-low technology: 1 if ISIC = 23, 25 - 28; 0 otherwise. 0.29 0.00 0.45 




The make and buy innovation activities are adopted by 58 % and 31 % of the sample, 
respectively. The highest rate of use of the make activity with regard to the buy activity 
corresponds to the evidence found in other empirical studies. When disintegrating the buy 
activity, one finds that 21 % of the plants outsourced R+D, whereas 17 % acquired external 
knowledge (see table 6.1). 21 
                                               
21  The correlation quotient between outsourcing and acquiring knowledge is 0.23 and is statistically 
significant at 1 %. 
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At the same time, 23 % of the plants adopt both make and buy, for which group it can also 
be observed that to outsource R+D is more frequent that to acquire external knowledge. 
 
About one third of the plants do not adopt any innovation activity, that is to say they are 
plants that report having obtained innovations in the 2003-2004 periods, but that they 
neither developed internal R+D activities nor did they buy external knowledge (passive 
plants). 
 
Table 6.1.: Innovation activities 
 
 
Activities Nº obs.  % of N = 522 
make 301 57.7 
buy 160 30.7 
 outsource 109 20.9 
 acquire 87 16.7 
make and buy 121 23.2 
 make and outsource  86 16.5 
 make and acquire 66 12.6 
none 182 34.9 
 
In relation to innovative performance, it was found that the average between innovated 
products or services sales and the total of sales was 21 %. Table 6.2. shows that the average 
performance of the groups of plants that adopt making and /or acquiring external 
knowledge is better than the average for the sample. On the contrary, the groups of plants 
that do not adopt innovation activities and those that adopt R+D outsourcing and making 
and R+D outsourcing obtain a lower than average performance.  
 
When innovative performance is measured by the declaration of achievement in product or 
service innovations, one finds that the plants that carry out innovation activities perform 
better than the average in the sample. 
 
Table 6.2.: Average innovative performance by innovation activity  
 
 
Activities Sales _inn inn_pos 
Make  0.23 0.87 
buy 0.19 0.83 
outsource 0.18 0.82 
acquire 0.22 0.85 
Make and buy 0.19 0.83 
Make and outsource 0.17 0.81 
Make and acquire 0.22 0.85 
none 0.18 0.66 
Whole sample 0.21 0.79 
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The results of the activity adoption model are detailed in table 6.3. and are aligned with the 
theory. 22  However, no evidence is obtained that would endorse the hypothesis of 
complementarity between the make and buy innovation activities.  
 
From the activity adoption model it can be seen that the scale of the plant increases the 
probability of make and buy, but in case of make one finds that as the scale of the plant 
increases, the propensity to adopt it decreases. The last is captured by the negative squared 
sign of the employment variable. 
 
The positive impact of employment on the probability of make is compatible with the 
hypotheses of economies of scale and scope, whereas the negative squared employment 
sign is compatible with the hypothesis of management diseconomies.  
 
The relevance of the scale of the plant for buying knowledge can be a consequence of the 
fact that relatively large plants have access to assets that allow them to reduce transaction 
costs (for example, they may be clients of a legal counsel office or they may have teams of 
technical professionals). 
 
The measure of external knowledge absorptive capacity helps to increase the probability of 
adopting both innovation activities although, with more intensity in buying than in making. 
This result suggests when it is less expensive for the firm to absorb external knowledge the 
propensity to buying increases, but simultaneously the probability of developing internal 
R+D activities increases. The above probably is due to the fact that higher exposure to 
external knowledge requires an investment also in assimilation capacities, or that it should 
be a reflection of the inertia of having accumulated knowledge in the past. 
 
The obtained results show that the perception of lack of knowledge protection makes it 
more probable that plants adopt make and it seems not to affect the choice to buy. On the 
contrary, the IPR access increases the probability of buy and does not affect the activity of 
make. 
 
The plants that put aside more resources for innovation adopt both innovation activities 
with more probability, while the controls of technological heterogeneity of the plants were 
not statistically relevant.  
 
It is estimated from the activity adoption model that the conditional correlation of the make 
and buy activities is positive (0.12), but not statistically significant. The above is not 
compatible with the hypothesis of complementarity between making and buying 
knowledge.  
 
The magnitude of the conditional correlation is lower than the level of unconditional 
correlation between both activities (0.24 %). The previous result shows that the 
unconditional positive correlation between the activities of making and buying is due to the 
scale of the plants, the capacity of knowledge absorption and the inputs for innovation, 
                                               
22 The results of the activities adoption model do not have significant differences when the plants that 
undertake cooperation in R+D activities are added to the sample (see Annex 2). 
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since such variables had parameters that coincided both in sign and statistical relevance for 
both activities (to see table 6.3.). 
 
Table 6.3.: Activity adoption Biprobit  
 
 
 Make  Buy  
0.1995 * 0.0748 + employment 
(0.0391)  (0.0384)  
-0.0084 * -0.0024  employment2 
(0.0019)  (0.0020)  
0.1309 ** 0.3078 * absorption 
(0.0610)  (0.0545)  
3.7210 * 0.0736 + inn_int 
(1.2761)  (0.0401)  
0.2005  0.5438 + dpi 
(0.3160)  (0.2876)  
2,0222 ** -0.4790  Adequacy 
(0.9227)  (0.8479)  
0.1499  -0.2553  b_tech 
(0.2169)  (0.2015)  
0.1110  0.0451  mb_tech 
(0.1764)  (0.1547)  
-2.3101 * -0.4773  Constant 
(0.8191)  (0.7600)  
Observations 522 522 
rho 0.1161 
W. chi2(16) = 105.92 (Prob > chi2 = 0.0000) 
  
 
note1: Standard errors between brackets. 
Note 2:+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
 
The direct complementarity test was carried out using innovative performance model. For 
two measures of innovative performance used in this study no evidence is found in favour 
of the hypothesis of complementarity between making and buying for the 2003-2004 period 
(see table 6.5.). 23 
 
When performance is approximated by the percentage of sale of innovated products in 
relation to total sales, the quotient estimated for the joint adoption of the making and buying 
activities is negative and statistically different from zero. Additionally, evidence shows that 
                                               
23 The results of the innovative performance model with the inclusion of plants collaborating in R+D and for 
the combination of making and acquiring and making and outsourcing activities can be found in Annex 3. It 
can be seen from there that a negative sign of the parameter associated with the joint development of activities 
can be verified. 
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the parameter is statistically lower than zero. 24 The above is corroborated when innovative 
performance is measured through obtaining innovated products or services. Consequently, 
the hypothesis of complementarity is rejected but additionally evidence of substitution 
between the innovation activities of making and buying is found. 
 
For both measures of innovative performance we can observe that the parameters 
associated with the activities of making and buying are positive. The parameter associated 
with the activity of making is statistically relevant for both performance measures, while 
the parameter related only to buying is for the case of obtaining product or service 
innovations (inn_pos). 
 
In relation to the control variables, it can be observed that the scale of the plant negatively 
affects innovative performance measured as a percentage of sales of innovated products, 
which coincides with the hypotheses the bigger the scale, the more difficult it is to obtain 
high representations of sales of innovated products or that the bigger the scale, the more 
bureaucracy there is which suppresses innovative performance. At the same time, no 
evidence is found of effects on innovative performance of the second order of the scale of 
the plants.  
 
For neither of two performance models can the relevance of exposure to competitiveness be 
verified nor the relevance of inputs for innovation. Nevertheless, it is necessary to 
emphasise that the sign of the parameters estimated for the export status of the plant was 
what had been expected. The above also occurs with R+D expense per worker in the Tobit 
model, but the sign is unexpected when innovative performance is measured through 
obtaining product or service innovations. 
 
In the third step of the methodology, that is to say when making, buying and making and 
buying are instrumentalized using the projections of the activity adoption model, the 
negative sign of the parameter associated with making and buying is verified, but not its 
significance (see table 6.6.). However, it is necessary to bear in mind that no good 
instrument for the buying activity has been obtained and that the projections of the activity 
adoption model activities are highly co-linear, making that all estimated parameters showed 
considerable increases in their standard error. 25 
 
Despite the above, after the adjustment for endogeneity, the signs of the parameters of 
innovation activities remain the same, similar to the signs of the control variables that were 
statistically significant in the second step of the methodology. 
 
The results permit to conclude that innovation activities of making and buying are not 
complementary, and that they would even have a substitutive relation. The conceptual 
                                               
24 A 1-tailed t test was applied to 5 % of significance for null hypothesis 012   and for the alternative 
012  hypothesis. 
25 All the used instruments have a coefficient of unconditional correlation with the variables that respectively 
instrumentalize a positive sign. Nevertheless, the conditional correlation between the instruments and the 
instrumentalized variables is only statistically significant for making; and making and buying. This way, there 
is not good instrument for the buying activity.  
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framework that guides this work suggests that there may be a substitution between making 
and buying when knowledge or technology bought externally has scarce novelty in the 
context of the firm. 
 
Low level of innovation can arise: first, because the plant cannot identify it ex ante the 
purchase, be it because of an error or absence in capacities. In this case, once knowledge 
was acquired, the lack of sufficient assimilation capacity can even lead to a saturation 
effect. Second, when firms look for smaller innovations in a technology in which they 
accumulate a high degree of knowledge. In this situation, the external knowledge is a 
perfect substitute for internal developments. 
 
Tabla 6.5.: Innovative performance  
 
  Sales _inn inn_pos 
  Tobit Probit 
-0.0190 ** -0.0512   employment 
(0.0087)   (0.0453)   
0.0005   0.0018   employment2 
(0.0004)   (0.0024)   
0.0183   0.1736   exports 
(0.0303)   (0.1423)   
0.0019   -0.0276   inn_int 
(0.0107)   (0.0426)   
0.1253 * 0.8237 * make 
(0.0349)   (0.1615)   
0.0750   0.4937 + buy 
(0.0544)   (0.2577)   
-0.1363 ** -0.7044 ** Make _buy 
(0.0643)   (0.3145)   
0.0013   0.0196   b_tech 
(0.0340)   (0.1614)   
-0.0843 ** -0.2161   mb_tech 
(0.0360)   (0.1742)   
0.1435 * 0.4660 * Constant 
(0.0347)   (0.1559)   
Observations 522 522 
  
note1: Standard errors between brackets. 











Table 6.6.: Innovative performance corrected by endogeneity  
 
  Sales _inn inn_pos 
  IV Tobit IV Probit 
0.1949 + 1,6306 * Make  
(0.1026)   (0.5645)   
0,6935   3,9828   Buy  
(0.5830)   (2,9396)   
-0.7612   -4,9082   Make _buy 
(0.5948)   (3,0118)   
-0.0156   -0.0396   employment 
(0.0120)   (0.0593)   
0.0002   0.0004   employment2 
(0.0007)   (0.0033)   
-0.0001   0.1207   exports 
(0.0382)   (0.1896)   
0.0031   -0.0195   inn_int 
(0.0108)   (0.0519)   
0.0110   0.0407   b_tech 
(0.0401)   (0.2018)   
-0.0821 ** -0.1661   mb_tech 
(0.0417)   (0.2085)   
0.0601   -0.0886   Constant 
(0.0804)   (0.4021)   
Observations 522 522 
 
note1: Standard errors between brackets. 





This study has used a methodology to evaluate the hypothesis of complementarity when 
firms can choose between two innovation activities. Specifically, the study deals with the 
case of complementarity between internal R+D activities and buying knowledge created 
outside the firm.  
 
The methodology was applied to a sample of 522 manufacturing and innovative plants in 
Chile, representative of the group of manufacturing and innovating plants from the 2005 IV 
Technological Innovation Survey. Thus, the work contributes novel evidence on the case of 
a country of average development, but with results that cannot be extrapolated to the 
population of manufacturing plants in Chile. 
 
The first exercise consisted of applying a weak complementarity test based on a model of 
selection of activities. It has been found that the conditional correlation between the studied 
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innovation activities is positive, but statistically irrelevant. From the above it is possible to 
conclude that the evidence found is not compatible with the hypothesis of complementarity. 
 
Subsequently, complementarity was evaluated within the framework of innovative 
performance model using a strong complementarity test. The results of the strong test for 
the different innovative performance measures that were used do not support the hypothesis 
of complementarity in the 2003-2004 periods. Even more, the results indicate that there is 
substitution between the make and buy innovation activities. 
 
Finally, the endogeneity of innovation activities was corrected following a two-stage 
procedure proposed by Cassiman and Vegeulers (2006). The negative sign of the parameter 
that identifies the combination of the make and buy activities was confirmed, but not its 
statistical relevance. However, no adequate instrument for the activity of buying external 
knowledge was obtained and the instruments were highly co-linear, which reduced the 
precision of the estimated parameters. 
 
The results permit us to conclude that make and buy innovation activities are not 
complementary, and that they would even have a substitutive relation. The conceptual 
framework that guides this work suggests that there can be a replacement between make 
and buy when knowledge or technology bought outside the firm has scarce novelty in the 
firm’s context. 
 
Low level of innovation can arise: first, because the plant cannot it ex ante the purchase, be 
it because of an error or absence of capacities. In this case, once knowledge was acquired, 
the lack of sufficient assimilation capacity can even lead to a saturation effect. Second, 
when firms look for smaller innovations in a technology in which they accumulate a high 
degree of knowledge. In this situation, the external knowledge is a perfect substitute for 
internal developments. 
 
Evidence suggests for the group of studied plants that the incentives for the buying of 
knowledge will not strengthen the performance of its internal R+D capacities, at least in the 
2003-2004 periods. Furthermore, such incentives might even reduce the innovative 
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Annex 1: Primary Information  
 
Sales _inn % of sales of new products over the total number of sales. The reported values are: 1 (0%), 2 (1-10%), 3 (10 to 30%), 4 (31-70%) and 5 (71-100%). 
Inn _pos 
During 2003 and/or 2004 the plants introduced technologically improved products, 
new for the establishment, new for the local market and/or new for the world (Yes 
= 1, No = 0). The structure of the question is identical for the case of services. 
Make  Carried out research and development in the plant in 2003 and/or 2004 (Yes = 1, No = 0). 
Buy  
Did it carry out research and development outside the plant in 2003 and/or 2004? 
and Did it acquire external knowledge (i.e. patents, licences, know-how) in 2003 
and/or 2004? (Yes = 1, No = 0). 
absorption 
How important have been for the plant’s innovation activities sources of 
information such as universities or other higher education institutions, public or 
government research institutes? (low = 1, medium = 2, high = 3 and very high = 4) 
dpi Total number of intellectual property rights requested by your plant (does not include commercial trademarks). 
adequacy  
What other factors do you perceive as obstacles or disincentives to technological 
innovation? Very easy to imitate innovation (low = 1, medium = 2, high = 3 and 
very high = 4) 
employment Indicate the number of all the plant’s employees (for each year indicate an average number)    
exports Indicate the amount of the plant’s exports in pesos for each year  




ISIC two digit: 15 - 36. 
 
 






















Annex 2: Activity adoption model  
 
Table A.2.1: Includes plants with R+D cooperation 
 
  Make  Buy 
0.1938 * 0.0916 ** employment 
(0.0368)   (0.0372)   
-0.0075 * -0.0037 + employment2 
(0.0017)   (0.0021)   
0.1275 ** 0.2884 * absorption 
(0.0566)   (0.0506)   
3.9945 * 0.0897 ** inn_int 
(1,3167)   (0.0415)   
0.2979   0,6027 ** dpi 
(0.3009)   (0.2729)   
1,8761 ** -0.2710   Adequacy  
(0.8832)   (0.7963)   
0.2962   -0.1593   b_tech 
(0.2070)   (0.1909)   
0.2213   0.1304   mb_tech 
(0.1691)   (0.1458)   
-2.3728 * -0.7472   Constant 
(0.7831)   (0.7170)   
Observations 590 590 
rho 0.1308 
 W. chi2(16) = 119.83 (Prob > chi2 = 0.0000) 
 
note1: Standard errors between brackets. 
















Annex 3: Model of innovative performance  
 
 




  Sales _inn Inn _pos 
  Tobit Probit 
-0.0197 ** -0.0461   employment 
(0.0081)   (0.0431)   
0.0006   0.0021   employment2 
(0.0004)   (0.0024)   
0.0039   0.1379   exports 
(0.0281)   (0.1334)   
0.0038   -0.0169   inn_int 
(0.0104)   (0.0456)   
0.1220 * 0.7862 * Make 
(0.0335)   (0.1539)   
0.0596   0.4194 + Buy 
(0.0526)   (0.2438)   
-0.1283 ** -0.5960 ** Make_buy 
(0.0620)   (0.2976)   
-0.0283   -0.0994   b_tech 
(0.0322)   (0.1530)   
-0.0976 * -0.2979 + mb_tech 
(0.0345)   (0.1668)   
0.1824 * 0.5751 * Constant 
(0.0336)   (0.1469)   
Observations 590 590 
 
note1: Standard errors between brackets. 

















Table A.3.2: Internal R+D and external knowledge acquisition  
 
  Sales _inn inn_pos 
  Tobit Probit 
-0.0193 ** -0.0520   employment 
(0.0089)   (0.0455)   
0.0005   0.0018   employment2 
(0.0004)   (0.0024)   
0.0128   0.1691   exports 
(0.0300)   (0.1415)   
0.0009   -0.0274   inn_int 
(0.0104)   (0.0419)   
0.1030 * 0.7339 * Make  
(0.0316)   (0.1440)   
0.1210   0.6474 + acquire 
(0.0765)   (0.3534)   
-0.1288   -0.7532 + Make 
_acquire (0.0871)   (0.4096)   
0.0036   0.0132   b_tech 
(0.0342)   (0.1602)   
-0.0897 ** -0.2492   mb_tech 
(0.0361)   (0.1734)   
0.1484 * 0.5081 * Constant 
(0.0336)   (0.1528)   
Observations 522 522 
 
note1: Standard errors between brackets. 























Table A.3.3: Internal R+D and commissioning external R+D  
 
  Sales _inn inn_pos 
  Tobit Probit 
-0.0182 ** -0.0486   employment 
(0.0088)   (0.0454)   
0.0005   0.0018   employment2 
(0.0004)   (0.0024)   
0.0184   0.1789   exports 
(0.0300)   (0.1415)   
0.0024   -0.0257   inn_int 
(0.0105)   (0.0432)   
0.1173 * 0.7791 * Make 
(0.0331)   (0.1507)   
0.0797   0.4601   outsource 
(0.0647)   (0.3254)   
-0.1596 ** -0.7321 + Make_ 
outsource (0.0733)   (0.3753)   
0.0021   0.0172   b_tech 
(0.0340)   (0.1613)   
-0.0797 ** -0.1959   mb_tech 
(0.0361)   (0.1737)   
0.1459 * 0.4898 * Constant 
(0.0344)   (0.1547)   
Observations 522 522 
 
 
note1: Standard errors between brackets. 
Note 2:+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
 
 
 
 
